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Introduction 
Originating from the general principles of the EU public procurement law, the restrictions on modifying 
public contracts have been developed further by the EU legislator in the 2014 public and utilities procure-
ment directives.*2 The directives follow the rationale of the CJEU case law,*3 prohibiting any substantial 
modifi cation of public contracts, and introduce detailed criteria for distinguishing acceptable contract mod-
ifi cations from unacceptable (substantial) ones. 
While the criterion of materiality as a measure of an amendment’s lawfulness has received a good amount 
of attention in legal literature,*4 equal attention has not been paid to wider legal implications and possible 
contradictions that can accompany the enforcement of these rules, particularly when the  interaction with 
national legal systems of the EU is taken into account. 
ɲ This work is supported by Estonian Research Council grant PUTɷɴɺ.
ɳ Directive ɳɱɲɵ/ɳɴ/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɷ February ɳɱɲɵ on the award of concession 
contracts, OJ L ɺɵ, ɳɹ/ɱɴ/ɳɱɲɵ, pp. ɲ–ɷɵ (the Concessions Directive); Directive ɳɱɲɵ/ɳɵ/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of ɳɷ February ɳɱɲɵ on public procurement and repealing Directive ɳɱɱɵ/ɲɹ/EC; OJ L ɺɵ, ɳɹ/ɴ/ɳɱɲɵ, 
pp. ɷɶ–ɳɵɳ (the Public Procurement Directive); Directive ɳɱɲɵ/ɳɶ/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of ɳɷ February ɳɱɲɵ on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and 
repealing Directive ɳɱɱɵ/ɲɸ/EC OJ L ɺɵ, ɳɹ/ɴ/ɳɱɲɵ, pp. ɳɵɴ–ɴɸɵ (the Utilities Directive).
ɴ Commission of the European Communities v. CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA, case C-ɵɷɺ/ɺɺ P, ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɵ:ɳɴɷ; pressetext 
Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse 
Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, case C-ɵɶɵ/ɱɷ, ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɹ:ɴɶɲ; Wall AG v. La ville 
de Francfort-sur-le-Main and Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES) GmbH, case C-ɺɲ/ɱɹ, ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɲɱ:ɲɹɳ.
ɵ A. Brown. When do changes to an existing public contract amount to the award of a new contract for the purpose of the EU 
procurement rules? Guidance at last in case C-ɵɶɵ/ɱɷ. – Public Procurement Law Review ɷ, ɳɱɱɹ, pp. NAɳɶɴ–ɳɷɸ; K. 
Hartlev, M.W. Liljenbøl. Changes to existing contracts under the EU public procurement rules and the drafting of review 
clauses to avoid the need for a new tender. – Public Procurement Law Review ɳ, ɳɱɲɴ; S. Treumer. Regulation of contract 
changes leading to a duty to retender the contract: The European Commission’s proposals of December ɳɱɲɲ. – Public 
Procurement Law Review ɶ, ɳɱɲɳ; S. Treumer. Contract changes and the duty to retender under the new EU public procure-
ment Directive. – Public Procurement Law Review ɴ, ɳɱɲɵ; M.A. Simovart. Lepinguvabaduse piirid riigihankes: Euroopa 
Liidu hankeõiguse mõju Eesti eraõigusele [‘Limits to Freedom of Contract: the Infl uence of EC Public Procurement Law on 
Estonian Private Law’], doctoral thesis], ɳɱɲɱ, available at https://dspace.utlib.ee/dspace/bitstream/handle/ɲɱɱɷɳ/ɲɶɲɵɹ/
simovart_mari_ann.pdf?sequence=ɶ (most recently accessed on ɲɷ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ); M.A. Simovart. Amendments to procurement 
contracts: Estonian law in the light of the Pressetext ruling. – Juridica International ɳɱɲɱ, No. ɲ, pp. ɲɶɲ–ɲɷɱ, available at 
http://www.juridicainternational.eu/index.php?id=ɲɵɶɹɲ (most recently accessed on ɲɷ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ); Hankelepingu lubatud ja 
keelatud muudatused uute riigihankedirektiivide ülevõtmise järel [‘Permitted and Prohibited Amendments After Transposi-
tion of the New Public Procurement Directives’]. Juridica ɳɱɲɷ/I, pp. ɶɳ–ɷɱ.
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/JI.2016.24.05
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The primary remedy that interested parties can rely on when learning of a possibly unlawful modifi ca-
tion is ineff ectiveness of the public contract.*5 However, because the contract performance phase is subject 
to the unharmonised private law of the Member States, enforcement of ineff ectiveness as a result of unlaw-
ful contract modifi cations might be prone to specifi c fundamental diffi  culties. This article intends to ‘map’ 
such diffi  culties by looking at the access to the remedy of ineff ectiveness in cases of unlawful public contract 
modifi cation as well as the collateral implications following the ineff ectiveness. 
1. Locus standi in claims of ineffectiveness due 
to unlawful public contract modifi cation 
1.1. The criteria for standing 
Any substantial modifi cation of a public contract needs a new award procedure,*6 the failure to conduct 
which can lead to ineff ectiveness of the contract. Depending on the national law, ineff ectiveness can be 
either retroactive cancellation of contractual obligations (ineff ectiveness ex tunc) or cancellation of obliga-
tions that are still to be performed (ineff ectiveness ex nunc) together with the application of other penal-
ties.*7 When a third party learns of a possibly unlawful modifi cation of a public contract, it can submit a 
claim to either the court or another review body (as designated by the Member State) with the aim of estab-
lishing ineff ectiveness of the contract. 
For the purpose of creating an effi  cient review system, a relatively wide circle of third parties should 
have reasonable access to and be encouraged to make active use of the remedies available under the national 
review systems.*8 The remedies directives oblige the Member States to make review procedures available 
to at least any and all concerned persons who fulfi l the following two conditions: (i) the person must have 
or have had an interest in obtaining the concerned public contract and (ii) the person must have been or 
must risk being harmed by the alleged infringement.*9  
While the remedies directives do not seek to harmonise the national legislation completely with regard 
to locus standi,*10 the national legislators are not free to give the established criteria any interpretation 
that could limit the eff ectiveness of the directive either.*11  Thus, at minimum, review procedures in public 
procurement have to be available to parties who are interested in the concerned contract and are, or can be, 
harmed by the challenged breach. 
The Member States may grant access to review more freely; however, the remedies system is not intended 
for availing stakeholders with indirect or general interest with the option to claim review of allegedly unlaw-
ful decisions or acts. For that purpose, the Member States can provide alternative options of review or allow 
for interests of the society to be considered or indirectly interested stakeholders to be involved otherwise. 
The possibility is mentioned in Recital 122 of the Public Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU)*12: ‘citi-
ɶ M.A. Simovart. Old remedies for new violations? The defi cit of remedies for enforcing public contract modifi cation rules. 
Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift ɳɱɲɶ/ɲ, available at http://urt.cc/sites/default/fi les/UrT%ɳɱɳɱɲɶ-ɲ_Simovert.pdf (most 
recently accessed on ɲɵ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ), p. ɴɶ.
ɷ Article ɵɴ (ɶ) of the Concessions Directive; Article ɸɳ (ɶ) of the Public Procurement Directive; Article ɹɺ (ɶ) of the Utilities 
Directive. 
ɸ Article ɳd (ɲ) (a) and (ɳ) of Council Directive ɹɺ/ɷɷɶ/EEC of ɳɲ December ɲɺɹɺ on the coordination of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts, amended by Council Directive ɺɳ/ɶɱ/EEC of ɲɹ June ɲɺɺɳ L ɳɱɺ and Directive ɳɱɱɸ/ɷɷ/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council; Article ɳ d (ɲ) (a) and (ɳ) of Council Directive ɺɳ/ɲɴ/EEC of ɳɶ February ɲɺɺɳ coordinating 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement pro-
cedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, amended by Council Directive 
ɳɱɱɷ/ɺɸ/EC of ɳɱ November ɳɱɱɷ and Directive ɳɱɱɸ/ɷɷ/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.
ɹ X. Zhang. Supplier review as a mechanism for securing compliance with government public procurement rules: A critical 
perspective. – Public Procurement Law Review ɶ, ɳɱɱɸ, pp. ɴɴɵ–ɴɴɷ, ɴɵɱ, ɴɶɲ.
ɺ Directive ɹɺ/ɷɷɶ and Directive ɺɳ/ɲɴ, Article ɲ (ɴ), hereinafter: the remedies directives.
ɲɱ Case C-ɶɸɱ/ɱɹ, Symvoulio Apochetefseon Lefkosias v. Anatheoritiki Archi Prosforon, ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɲɱ:ɷɳɲ, para. ɴɸ.
ɲɲ Case ɳɴɱ/ɱɳ, Grossmann Air Service, Bedarfsluftfahrtunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Republik Österreich. 
ECLI:EU: C:ɳɱɱɵ:ɺɴ, para. ɵɳ.
ɲɳ Directive ɳɱɲɵ/ɳɵ/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of ɳɷ February ɳɱɲɵ on public procurement and 
repealing Directive ɳɱɱɵ/ɲɹ/EC, OJ L ɺɵ, ɳɹ/ɴ/ɳɱɲɵ, pp. ɷɶ–ɳɵɳ.
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zens, concerned stakeholders, […] and other persons or bodies which do not have access to review proce-
dures pursuant to Directive 89/665/EEC do nevertheless have a legitimate interest, as taxpayers, in sound 
procurement procedures. They should therefore be given a possibility, otherwise than through the review 
system pursuant to Directive 89/665/EEC and without it necessarily involving them being given standing 
before courts and tribunals, to indicate possible violations of this Directive to a competent authority or 
structure. So as not to duplicate existing authorities or structures, Member States should be able to provide 
for recourse to general monitoring authorities or structures, sectorial oversight bodies, municipal oversight 
authorities, competition authorities, the ombudsman or national auditing authorities.’  In addition, Article 
3 of Directive 89/665 provides for the Commission having a general power to intervene in matters where a 
serious infringement of EU law needs correction but has not been challenged.*13
In this light, questions arise with regard to cases like the recent UK decision in the matter of Winchester 
City Council*14 where a councillor successfully applied for review of a decision by the City Council to modify 
a contract for the development of real estate without conducting a proper procurement for the modifi cation. 
The applicant, Mr. Gottlieb, was neither an actual nor a potential bidder but instead a person clearly repre-
senting a general interest (‘a resident, council tax payer, and City Councilor […] seeking to ensure that the 
elected authority […] complies with the law, spends public funds wisely, and secures through open competi-
tion the most appropriate development scheme for the City’*15). Despite that, he was found to have standing 
to challenge the City’s decision to modify a contract with a developer, on the grounds that it breached the 
EU rules on public contract modifi cation.  
While it may be ‘uplifting’*16 to see such a defender of indirect interests receive the standing and a 
doubtless just decision be awarded in the particular matter, the implications of giving standing overly gen-
erously in public contract cases in general can have a signifi cant downside. Mainly, the risk of public con-
tracts’ validity being too easily challenged reduces legal certainty and counteracts the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. Besides, fundamental diff erences in the national practice of allowing access to review could 
be argued to lead to lack of uniformity of the EU public procurement law with regard to remedies. Even 
though the CJEU has denied that national laws including contracting authorities within the class of per-
sons to whom the review action is available would lead to a lack of uniformity in the application of the EU 
law,*17 Recital 122 of Directive 2014/24/EU can be understood to indicate that the class of persons entitled 
to review should nevertheless not be extended to include persons protecting the general interests. The case 
of Winchester could therefore be treated rather as an exception justifi ed by the accumulation of specifi c 
circumstances (the applicant being a council member, the subject matter of the contract pertaining to city 
planning and development – an area subject to very high public interest – etc.), as opposed to a routine 
example of fi nding standing in unlawful contract modifi cation matters. 
It is noteworthy that the rationale underlying government contract modifi cation rules in the US is very 
close to the EU approach*18: any modifi cation changing the purpose or nature of a contract so substantially 
that the original and the modifi ed contract are materially diff erent is subject to the statutory requirement 
for full and open competition*19 as provided under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA).*20 Not unlike 
ɲɴ Case C-ɶɸɱ/ɱɹ, Symvoulio Apochetefseon Lefkosias v. Anatheoritiki Archi Prosforon, paras ɳɷ, ɴɵ.
ɲɵ R. Gottlieb (On the Application Of) v. Winchester City Council [ɳɱɲɶ] EWHC ɳɴɲ (Admin); [ɳɱɲɶ] A.C.D. ɸɵ. See also R. 
Ashmore. Variations on a theme (Pressetext in action) / changes to development plans in favor of commercial developer 
successfully challenged: R (on app. Gottlieb) v. Winchester City Council. – Public Procurement Law Review ɴ, ɳɱɲɶ, NAɹɲ–
NAɹɸ; S.H. Bailey. Refl ections on standing for judicial review in procurement cases. – Public Procurement Law Review ɵ, 
ɳɱɲɶ, pp. ɲɳɳ–ɲɴɳ.
ɲɶ R. Gottlieb (On the Application Of) v. Winchester City Council [ɳɱɲɶ] EWHC ɳɴɲ (Admin), p. ɲɶɲ.
ɲɷ Ashmore, p. NAɹɸ, commending that decision as well as the overall modern liberal approach to standing in the public law 
of the UK; see Bailey, pp. ɲɳɶ, ɲɳɺ, ɲɴɳ.
ɲɸ Case C-ɶɸɱ/ɱɹ, Symvoulio Apochetefseon Lefkosias v. Anatheoritiki Archi Prosforon, paras ɴɷ–ɴɸ.
ɲɹ See also C.R. Yukins. The European procurement directives and the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (T-TIP): 
Advancing U.S. – European trade and cooperation in procurement (ɳɱɲɵ). GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 
ɳɱɲɵ–ɲɶ; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. ɳɱɵ-ɲɶ. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=ɳɵɴɴɳɲɺ or http://dx.doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɳɲɴɺ/ssrn.ɳɵɴɴɳɲɺ (most recently accessed on ɲɶ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ), p. ɲɶ. There are some signifi cant diff erences in the details 
of applying the general prohibition of material changes, though. E.g., while the US approach seems to favour broadly defi ned 
and general contracts for the purpose of accepting rather large-scale modifi cations, the EU’s newly established contract-
modifi cation rules denounce overly wide discretion, standing clearly for specifi c and precisely drafted changes clauses. These 
diff erences do not, however, aff ect the suitability of comparing the practices with regard to standing requirements.
ɲɺ AT&T Commc’ns, Inc. v. Wiltel, Inc., ɲ F.ɴd ɲɳɱɲ, ɲɳɱɵ (ɲɺɺɴ); CCL, Inc., ɴɺ Fed. Cl. ɲɹɱ, ɲɺɲ–ɺɳ (ɲɺɺɸ). 
ɳɱ ɵɲ USCA §ɴɴɱɲ (a).
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the EU law are also the basic criteria for establishing standing in procurement protests: actual or prospec-
tive bidders whose direct interest would be aff ected towards such award or failure are entitled to protest the 
decisions.*21 The case law concerning unlawful contract modifi cation in the USA’s federal procurement has 
been accumulating already since 1880.*22 Given the shared policy goals of the EU and US public procure-
ment systems, the more ‘experienced’ case law of the US provides a valuable basis for comparison. A brief 
look at the US practice is therefore included in the following analysis.
1.2. Suffi cient interest in the modifi ed public contract
Mostly, procurement claims concern steps of the award procedure where the criterion of interest is satisfi ed 
when the person participates in the award procedure, even though a possibility or likelihood of winning 
the contract is not a required criterion for establishing standing.*23 As a rule, it is diffi  cult for a person who 
has not participated in the award procedure to demonstrate such an interest.*24 The situation is diff erent, 
however, in challenging of a contracting authority’s decision to (not) advertise a contract*25 – for instance, 
in the case of unlawful contract modifi cation. In such cases, potential contractors must be entitled to bring 
a claim. 
In the US, multiple fora for raising government-contract-related protests have developed historically: 
at present, parties are able to submit protests either to the United States Court of Federal Claims or to the 
Government Accountability Offi  ce (GAO).*26 The extensive case law accumulated by the GAO as the main 
venue for protest action generally follows the line of reasoning that a party does not have a suffi  cient inter-
est when said party would not be ineligible to compete for the contract if the protest were resolved in its 
favour.*27 Parties who could not act as bidders even potentially are not considered to be interested parties in 
procurement protests in general,*28 and not in contract modifi cation cases in particular.*29 Under the same 
rationale, subcontractors are refused standing in contract modifi cation protests,*30 even though individual 
exceptions to that understanding have been mentioned.*31 As a rule, for purposes of a protest alleging that 
changes to a government contract are so substantial that the contract should be terminated and a new 
ɳɲ ɴɲ U.S.C. §ɴɶɶɲ(ɳ), ɵ C.F.R. §ɳɲ.ɱ(a) (ɲ). 
ɳɳ C.D. Swan. Lessons from across the pond: Comparable approaches to balancing contractual effi  ciency and accountability in 
the U.S. bid protest and European procurement review systems. – Public Contract Law Journal ɵɴ.ɲ (Fall ɳɱɲɴ), p. ɴɶ.
ɳɴ D. Pachnou. The Eff ectiveness of Bidder Remedies for Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: A Case Study of the 
Public Works Sector in the United Kingdom and Greece. University of Nottingham ɳɱɱɴ, p. ɲɱɷ.
ɳɵ Dischendorfer. Challenging discriminatory technical specifi cations under the Remedies Directives: The Grossmann case. 
P.P.L.R. ɳɱɱɵ, ɵ, NAɺɹ–ɲɱɳ , p. NAɲɱɳ.
ɳɶ S. Arrowsmith. The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, ɳɱɱɶ, para. ɳɲ.ɷ; R. Caranta. Damages for breaches of EU 
public procurement law: Issues of causation and recoverable losses. – D. Fairgrieve, F. Lichere, editors. Public Procurement 
Law: Damages As an Eff ective Remedy. Oxford and Portland, Oregon, ɳɱɲɲ, pp. ɲɷɸ–ɲɷɹ.
ɳɷ On controversies in applying the standing rules in government contract disputes, see B.M. Byrd. Contractors stand strong: 
Those ‘adversely aff ected or aggrieved by agency action’ should have standing to expose government procurement regulation 
violations to mitigate waste in contingency contracting. – Federal Circuit Bar Journal ɳɳ, ɳɱɲɴ, passim; F.W. Claybrook, Jr. 
Standing, prejudice, and prejudging in bid protest cases. – Public Contract Law Journal ɴɴ, Spring ɳɱɱɵ, passim; F.W. Clay-
brook, Jr. Please check your crystal ball at the courtroom door – a call for the judiciary in bid protest actions to let agencies 
do their job. – Public Contract Law Journal ɴɹ, Winter ɳɱɱɺ, passim; W. N. Keyes. Government Contracts under the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation. Thomson West ɳɱɱɴ, pp. ɸɴɷ, ɸɴɹ, ɸɷɲ; P.H. Polling. The Federal Circuit’s folly: Misconstruing 
government contractor standing rules in the Court of Federal Claims. – Public Contract Law Journal ɴɷ, Fall ɳɱɱɷ, passim. 
ɳɸ R. Prevost. Contract modifi cation vs. new procurement: An analysis of General Accounting Offi  ce decisions. – Public Contract 
Law Journal, ɲɶ.ɸɲɺɹɶ, p. ɵɶɵ. 
ɳɹ  There have been exceptions to that rule. E.g., a proposed or possible subcontractor can be an interested party ‘where no other 
immediate party had a greater interest concerning the issue raised and where there was a possibility that the subcontractor's 
interest would be inadequately protested if our bid protest forum were restricted solely to potential awardees’ (California 
Microwave, Inc., ɶɵ Comp. Gen. ɳɴɲ (ɲɺɸɵ), ɸɵ–ɳ CPD ɲɹɲ; Abbott Power Corporation, B–ɲɹɷɶɷɹ, December ɳɲ, ɲɺɸɷ, ɸɷ–ɳ 
CPD ɶɱɺ). Also, ‘a subcontractor whose product was mentioned by name in the specifi cations was suffi  ciently interested 
to protest the solicitation’s “brand name or equal” provisions’ (Mosler Systems Division, American Standard Company, 
B–ɳɱɵɴɲɷ, March ɳɴ, ɲɺɹɳ, ɹɳ–ɲ CPD ɳɸɴ). An electrician-subcontractor was considered to have a standing to challenge 
‘the wage rates for electricians set forth in the solicitation’ (Rosendin Electric, Inc., ɷɱ Comp. Gen. ɳɸɲ (ɲɺɹɲ), ɹɲ–ɲ CPD 
ɲɲɺ (most recently accessed on ɺ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ)).
ɳɺ Prevost ɲɺɹɶ, p. ɵɶɶ.
ɴɱ International Genomics Consortium v. the United States, ɲɱɵ Fed. Cl. ɷɷɺ (ɳɱɲɳ), ɷɷɺ, ɷɸɵ. 
ɴɲ Keyes ɳɱɱɴ, p. ɸɵɷ; Prevost ɲɺɹɶ, pp. ɵɶɶ, ɵɷɳ.
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competition conducted, only a party who can participate as a potential off eror has a direct and established 
interest in the opportunity to compete for the award.*32 
The case of Onix Networking Corporation*33 provides an example: The Peace Corps solicited a contract 
to renew its existing software licences for Microsoft products and to acquire technical services, limiting 
the original competition to authorised Microsoft resellers only and awarding the contract to En Pointe, a 
reseller of Microsoft products and services. Later, the Peace Corps decided to acquire ‘cloud-based’ e-mail 
as a service (EaaS) as opposed to its existing e-mail functionality and for that purpose conducted a pilot 
programme to test both Microsoft and Google EaaS products. Even though the test users praised both 
products as appealing, the Microsoft EaaS product was ordered from En Pointe via a contract modifi cation 
eventually. The modifi cation was protested by Onix, an authorised reseller of Google products, and ruled 
to be improper by the GAO.*34 Even though the Peace Corps claimed Onix not to be an interested party, 
as it could not meet the requirements set for the modifi cation, the GAO found otherwise. Because the con-
tracting agency had never issued any actual defi nitive requirements as to delivering the desired product, 
there was no basis for fi nding the protestor incapable of meeting the (non-existent) requirements and no 
reason to not consider them to be an interested party, inter alia, the GAO took into account that some of the 
desired features as referred to by the agency were allegedly restrictive of competition and if offi  cially stated 
in a competition would be challenged by the protestor.*35 
In some cases pertaining to public contract modifi cations, it has been argued that the circle of inter-
ested parties should be limited to the participants in the initial tender, when there was one. The reason this 
argument is not justifi ed relies fi rstly on the very logic prohibiting substantial contract changes. As estab-
lished in the landmark case Pressetext as well as the 2014 directives, it is, namely, the hypothetical implica-
tion of the amendment for the results of the original award procedure that serves as a criterion for fi nding 
an amendment unacceptable. Had the change been made to the terms of the initial award procedure, the 
contract might have attracted diff erent bidders or could have been awarded to a diff erent entity. The party 
disputing the amendment can very well belong to the group of such potentially attracted diff erent bidders. 
Secondly, the initial procedure may have taken place a relatively long time ago, in which case there might 
not be a real correlation between any previous and present interests. Thirdly, should a modifi cation truly 
appear to be a signifi cant one, it creates a de facto new contract that has actually never been subject to an 
award procedure at all. Such situations must be regarded as not unlike other cases of failure to advertise and 
must allow any potential contractors to challenge the unlawful decision, without the need to show actual 
participation in the initial contract award procedure.
This conclusion is supported by the US case law as well. For instance, in a case of a government contract 
for the lease and the recycling of acrylic plastic media, awarded by the Department of the Air Force, Poly-
Pacifi c Technologies, Inc., the protester, did not submit a proposal in the original competition because it 
was not on the list of qualifi ed providers of the required type of plastic media at the time when proposals 
were due. However, it later became approved as a qualifi ed provider. In a protest concerning contract modi-
fi cation, Poly-Pacifi c were found to be a prospective off eror with direct economic interest aff ected by the 
failure to award the contract properly.*36 The mere fact that the protester could not or did not participate 
in the award procedure preceding the initial contract award does not take away its chances of challenging 
unlawful amendment of that contract.*37
ɴɳ E.g., Memorex Corporation, B-ɳɱɱɸɳɳ, Oct. ɳɴ, ɲɺɹɲ, ɷɲ Comp.Gen. ɵɳ, pp. ɲ, ɵ.
ɴɴ Onix Networking Corporation, B-ɵɲɲɹɵɲ, Nov. ɺ, ɳɱɲɶ, http://gao.gov/assets/ɷɹɱ/ɷɸɴɷɳɱ.pdf (most recently accessed on 
ɸ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɵ The ruling pointed to ‘a fundamental fl aw in the agency’s logic’: while the original competition had been limited to Microsoft 
resellers only, indicating that only Microsoft products would meet the agency’s requirements, subsequent actions such as the 
pilot programme ‘explicitly recognize that there are fi rms other than Microsoft authorized resellers, and products other than 
Microsoft’s EaaS product, that are available to meet the agency’s requirement’. Furthermore, the original competition never 
contemplated the acquisition of cloud-based EaaS or of any other entirely new product or service but was, on the contrary, 
limited to a specifi c list of products and services. Onix Networking Corporation, B-ɵɲɲɹɵɲ, pp. ɲ–ɴ, ɷ–ɺ.
ɴɶ Onix Networking Corporation, B-ɵɲɲɹɵɲ, pp. ɵ–ɶ (most recently accessed on ɸ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɷ Poly-Pacifi c Technologies, Inc., B-ɳɺɷɱɳɺ, June ɲ, ɳɱɲɶ, http://gao.gov/assets/ɴɹɱ/ɴɸɵɵɷɷ.pdf, p. ɳ (most recently accessed 
on ɹ.ɳ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɴɸ Ibid., p. ɳ; see also Memorex Corporation, B-ɳɱɱɸɳɳ, p. ɵ.
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1.3. Prejudice caused by the unlawful modifi cation
Prejudice, or suff ering of harm through the challenged breach, is an essential element of standing in the 
US.*38 However, there is some controversy with regard to establishing the prejudice as a part of the protes-
tor’s standing.*39  
On the one hand, cases like Myers suggest a protestor must show that it would be a qualifi ed bidder, 
regarding the mere fact that it might have submitted a bid as insuffi  cient.*40  On the other hand, judgements 
like the one in the above-referred-to Poly-Pacifi c regard the loss of a chance to participate in a competition 
for a federal contract as suffi  cient to fi nd the protester prejudiced by the improper modifi cation.*41 Similarly, 
in the case of Distributed Solutions, Inc., the Court established that the plaintiff s suff ered a loss of an oppor-
tunity to compete fully and fairly for a federal procurement opportunity and therefore suff ered a ‘non-trivial 
competitive injury suffi  cient to satisfy the jurisdictional standing requirement’.*42 (Even more confusingly, 
some GAO rulings point out that the protestor, in order to show the prejudice, must show how the challenged 
modifi cation would have infl uenced the original competition.*43 This approach cannot be justifi ed. While it 
is right to compare the original and the modifi ed contracts in order to establish whether the modifi cation is a 
substantial one, there is no reason to compare the chances of the protestor in the actual and hypothetical past 
competitions for the purpose of establishing the suff ering of loss through a contract modifi cation.) 
The protests based on unlawful contract modifi cation are aimed at opening a new competition, the 
exact terms of which are unknown at the time of the dispute. It’s therefore the chance of bidding in such 
hypothetical competition that should be looked at when establishing the presence of a prejudice. A protes-
tor should be able to show that it could reasonably be awarded the new contract and is suff ering from harm 
by way of missing that chance. The protestor does not have to convince the court that it would have been 
awarded the contract had the procedure been lawfully undertaken.*44 
Not unlike the US requirement of prejudice, the EU remedies directives allow the Member States to 
make the review procedures subject to the claimant being or risking being harmed by the alleged infringe-
ment.*45 The CJEU has never actually had a chance to articulate its position on this issue. The question of 
establishing ‘harm’ was posed to the CJEU in the Pressetext case: ‘Is “harmed” in Article 1 (3) of Directive 
89/665 […] and in Article 2 (1) (c) of that directive to be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking [...] is 
harmed […] simply where he has been deprived of the opportunity to participate in a procurement proce-
dure because the contracting authority did not, prior to making the award, publish a contract notice, on the 
basis of which the undertaking could have tendered for the contract to be awarded, could have submitted 
an off er or could have had the claim that exclusive rights were involved reviewed by the competent procure-
ment review body?’. The question was presented conditionally, depending on the court’s answer to the fi rst 
questions, and in light of these, the Court did not have to answer it.*46 
However, the opinion of Advocate General Kokott in the case of Pressetext off ers a good insight into the 
matter of establishing harm as a part of the locus standi test. It suggests that application of the standards 
of locus standi and restriction of access to review options must ‘not aff ect the practical eff ectiveness of the 
directive’.*47 Therefore, the right to bring an action in procurement review proceedings may not be restricted 
ɴɹ Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc. v. United States, ɳɸɶ F.ɴd ɲɴɷɷ (ɳɱɱɳ), ɲɴɷɷ.
ɴɺ See Byrd ɳɱɲɴ, passim; Claybrook ɳɱɱɵ, passim; Claybrook ɳɱɱɺ, passim. 
ɵɱ Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc. v. United States, ɲɴɷɷ.
ɵɲ Poly-Pacifi c Technologies, Inc., B-ɳɺɷɱɳɺ, p. ɷ. 
ɵɳ Distributed Solutions, Inc., and STR, L.L.C. v. the United States, ɲɱɵ Fed. Cl. ɴɷɹ (ɳɱɲɳ), ɴɷɹ, ɴɸɸ, ɴɹɱ. See also Weeks 
Marine, Inc. v. United States, ɶɸɶ F.ɴd ɲɴɶɳ, ɲɴɷɳ (Fed. Cir. ɳɱɱɺ).
ɵɴ E.g.: Armed Forces Hospitality, LLC, B-ɳɺɹɺɸɹ.ɳ, B-ɳɺɹɺɸɹ.ɴ, Oct. ɲ, ɳɱɱɺ, http://gao.gov/assets/ɴɺɱ/ɴɹɷɹɺɷ.pdf, pp. ɺ–ɲɱ; 
Emergent BioSolutions Inc., B-ɵɱɳɶɸɷ, June ɹ, ɳɱɲɱ, http://gao.gov/assets/ɴɺɱ/ɴɹɺɲɹɸ.pdf, p. ɲɵ (most recently accessed 
on ɲɷ.ɴ.ɳɱɲɷ).
ɵɵ Claybrook ɳɱɱɺ, pp. ɴɹɵ, ɴɹɷ, ɴɹɺ. 
ɵɶ Case ɳɵɺ/ɱɲ, Werner Hackermüller v. Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft mbH (BIG) and Wiener Entwicklungsgesellschaft 
mbH für den Donauraum AG (WED), ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɴ:ɴɶɺ, para. ɲɺ.
ɵɷ Pressetext, paras ɳɸ, ɹɺ.
ɵɸ The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on ɲɴ March ɳɱɱɹ. Case C-ɵɶɵ/ɱɷ, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur 
GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse Agentur registrierte 
Genossens chaft mit beschränkter Haftung. ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɹ:ɲɷɸ, para. ɲɵɵ; reference to the following: Case C-ɵɲɱ/ɱɲ, 
Fritsch, Chiari & Partner and Others, paras ɴɲ, ɴɵ; Case C-ɵɸɱ/ɺɺ, Universale-Bau, para. ɸɳ; and Case C-ɳɴɱ/ɱɳ, Gross-
mann Air Service, para. ɵɳ.
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disproportionately. With regard to the standard of ‘harm’, asserting that there is a possibility of the occur-
rence of damage must be suffi  cient. Furthermore, the possibility of harm ‘must be presumed where it is not 
manifestly excluded that the applicant would have received the award if the legal infringement alleged had 
not occurred’.*48 This way, the requirement of harm is applied so as to open review procedures to a wider 
rather than a smaller circle of interested parties,*49 as the essence of the review system demands.
Decisions on contract modifi cation should be open to review on fl exible grounds, rejecting as inadmis-
sible ab initio by reference to a lack of standing only the cases where the lack of standing is so plainly obvi-
ous as to require no further examination.*50 An example of a ‘plainly obvious’ impossibility of competing 
would be present in the case of a company that conducts business in an area diff erent from that expected 
under the concerned contract (a shoemaking factory challenging a construction contract). Also, any person 
who would be excluded from the procurement under the mandatory clauses of exclusion*51 (e.g., due to par-
ticipation in terrorist off ences, money-laundering, child labour, etc.) shouldn’t have standing, perhaps with 
possible exceptions where they demonstrate reasonable grounds for applying the self-cleaning exception*52 
or an exception for overriding reasons related to the public interest*53. 
In conclusion, in cases of illegal direct contracting, both the party’s interest towards the modifi ed con-
tract and suff ering of loss must be considered to be present whenever the company could be able to bid in 
the hypothetical award procedure that should be conducted instead of modifi cation of the concerned con-
tract. Only when it is ‘plainly obvious’ that the person is not capable of competing for the contract should 
they have no standing. Otherwise, overly restricted access to the proceedings would render any eff ective 
review excessively diffi  cult, possibly limiting the eff ective enforcement of the directive and counteracting 
the purposes of the whole remedies system. 
2. Indirect implications of public contract ineffectiveness
2.1. Scope of ineffectiveness
While the basic essence of ineff ectiveness is well defi ned as exclusion of the continued legal force of a public 
contract, the directives leave some room for diff erent interpretations regarding the scope of the impact of 
ineff ectiveness. Namely, it is not clear whether the resulting ineff ectiveness must concern the whole modifi ed 
contract or can apply to the unlawful amendment only. Both possibilities can be deduced from the language 
in the famous case Pressetext*54 where the Court describes substantial amendments as renegotiations of 
the initial contract as well as de facto new awards. Here, the references to the use of negotiated procedure 
without publication seem to support the understanding that a new award of additional or repeated services, 
if necessary, can be isolated from the rest of the contract (e.g., para. 36). On the other hand, description of an 
amendment as renegotiation of the initial contract looks at the modifi ed contract as a whole (e.g., para. 34). 
Similarly, both the duty to retender the initial (renegotiated) contract and the obligation to conduct a 
new tender for the amendment have been referred to in the literature.*55 S.T. Poulsen has openly acknowl-
edged that a new tendering procedure can be necessary either for a whole new contract or for a supple-
mentary contract dealing with the amendment.*56 That approach seems to correspond to the traditional 
ɵɹ The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-ɵɶɵ/ɱɷ, para. ɲɵɹ.
ɵɺ Case ɳɵɺ/ɱɲ, Hackermüller, paras ɳɳ, ɳɵ–ɳɺ. Also Case ɲɱɱ/ɲɳ, Fastweb SpA v. Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Alessandria. 
ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɲɴ:ɵɵɹ, paras ɳɷ–ɳɺ.
ɶɱ The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-ɵɶɵ/ɱɷ, paras ɲɵɷ–ɲɶɱ.
ɶɲ The Concessions Directive, Article ɴɹ; the Public Procurement Directive, Article ɶɷ; the Utilities Directive, Article ɹɱ.
ɶɳ The Concessions Directive, Article ɴɹ (ɺ); the Public Procurement Directive, Article ɶɷ, Section ɷ; the Utilities Directive, 
Article ɹɱ.
ɶɴ The Concessions Directive, Article ɴɹ (ɷ) the Public Procurement Directive, Article ɶɷ, Section ɴ; the Utilities Directive, 
Article ɹɱ.
ɶɵ Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v. Republik Österreich (Bund), APA-OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA 
Austria Presse Agentur registrierte Genossenschaft mit beschränkter Haftung. ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɹ:ɴɶɲ.
ɶɶ Most references have been made to the duty to retender the modifi ed contract (i.e., the whole contract as opposed to just the 
modifi ed part of it) – e.g., K. Hartlev, M.W. Liljenbøl ɳɱɲɴ, pp. ɶɲ, ɶɵ; Treumer ɳɱɲɳ, pp. ɲɶɵ, ɲɶɶ, ɲɷɶ; Treumer ɳɱɲɵ, p. 
ɲɵɹ. However, the requirement of a new tender for additional works only is mentioned in Treumer, ɳɱɲɵ, p. ɲɶɱ. 
ɶɷ S.T. Poulsen. The possibilities of amending a public contract without a new competitive tendering procedure under EU 
law. – Public Procurement Law Review ɶ, ɳɱɲɳ, pp. ɲɷɸ–ɲɹɸ (on pp. ɲɷɸ, ɲɷɹ, ɲɸɱ).
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 civil-law rule: when a part of a contract appears to be illegal, the rest of the contract can continue to be 
in force if the illegal part is separable from the rest, unless entry into the contract was conditional on the 
illegal part to begin with.*57 By the same rationale, an unlawfully modifi ed public contract can remain in 
force without the modifi ed part when the modifi cation can be separated out – presuming that making the 
modifi cation was not a precondition for entering into the public contract. 
Among the cases of substantial modifi cations listed in the directives, additional works (supplies and 
services) that overstep the limits provided in Section 1 (b) could perhaps be examples of separable modifi -
cations. The same could apply to modifi cations that considerably extend the scope of a contract (Section 4 
(c)), particularly extensions in time – an additional contract period for services, for example. On the other 
hand, an unlawful change of contracting partner could serve as an example of change that probably can-
not be separated from the rest of the contract, unless the substitution is clearly intended for a part of the 
contract only. 
Any specifi c diffi  culties seem largely attributable to cases where the whole contract should have been 
put out for a new tender, as opposed to modifi cations separable from the initial contract that do not infl u-
ence the validity of the initial contract and thus provide no particular diffi  culties in comparison to random 
cases of contract ineff ectiveness.
2.2. Negative infl uence on contractors (suppliers)
For obvious reasons, a breach of contract-modifi cation rules always occurs within a framework of valid 
contractual relations and may possibly happen in an advanced stage of contract performance. In a situation 
where the contractor (service provider) has already devoted signifi cant eff orts and costs to preparing and in 
anticipation of the performance, as well as in the course of actual performance, public contract ineff ective-
ness can subject the contractor to major negative consequences fi nancially.*58 
This can be particularly true when the contract terms provide for no payments by the contracting 
authority until the last phases of delivery, demand expensive warranties from the contractor, or make the 
contractor enter into costly agreements with subcontractors or suppliers which agreements ineff ectiveness 
renders it unable to fulfi l. Moreover, in the outcome, ineff ectiveness can have especially serious conse-
quences with regard to arrangements of fi nancing.*59 Although all of that can also apply in cases of ineff ec-
tive initial contracting, the diff erence lies, fi rstly, in the fact that an unlawfully modifi ed contract started out 
as a perfectly legitimate contractual relationship. Secondly, while the term for claiming ineff ectiveness of 
an illegally awarded contract starts to run from the beginning of the contract period, the same term for an 
illegal modifi cation proceeds from the moment of making the illegal amendment, which itself can follow an 
already extensive contract period. In comparison, the implication of ineff ectiveness of modifi ed contracts 
therefore carries the possibility of somewhat more complications. 
In addition to immediate fi nancial implications, agreeing to an unlawful public contract modifi cation 
may subject the contractor to collateral consequences in future procurements. Namely, under the new 
directives, contracting bodies will be entitled or – depending on the Member State’s law – even obliged 
to exclude a tenderer from an award procedure if the latter ‘has shown signifi cant […] defi ciencies in the 
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract […] which led to early termination 
of that prior contract, damages or other comparable sanctions’.*60 It is not clear whether unlawful modifi ca-
tions of public contracts can be regarded as such signifi cant defi ciencies in the performance of a substantive 
requirement under a public contract. 
The answer may be positive when one considers the contract-modifi cation rules to be an implicit part of 
the contract, or if the public contract incorporates the rules on modifi cation by reference or expressly lists 
ɶɸ See also K. Struckmann, P. Hodal. Private enforcement of contract ineff ectiveness: A practitioner’s point of view. – European 
Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review ɺ, ɳɱɲɵ, p. ɴɳ.
ɶɹ A decision of ineff ectiveness can cause ‘considerable upset and fi nancial losses’ to all parties concerned, including the suc-
cessful tenderer – Case C-ɲɷɷ/ɲɵ, MedEval – Qualitäts-, Leistungs- und Struktur-Evaluierung im Gesundheitswesen GmbH. 
ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɲɶ:ɸɸɺ, p. ɵɱ.
ɶɺ Struckmann, Hodal ɳɱɲɵ, pp. ɴɳ–ɴɴ.
ɷɱ Article ɴɹ (ɸ) (f) of the Concessions Directive; Article ɶɸ (ɵ) (g) of the Public Procurement Directive. The Utilities Directive 
refers to the possibility of using the same grounds established under the Public Procurement Directive – Utilities Directive, 
Article ɹɱ (ɲ). 
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the same rules. In the latter case, the breach of modifi cation rules really would equate to a ‘defi ciency in the 
performance’. It also clearly leads to sanctions comparable to those for early termination, as the directive 
requires as the second precondition for exclusion. 
The recitals of the directive explain the necessity for such a clause, referring, inter alia, to the contract-
ing authority’s need to ‘be able to exclude candidates or tenderers whose performance in earlier public 
contracts has shown […] misbehavior that casts serious doubts as to the reliability of the economic opera-
tor’. Can participation in a prior unacceptable contract modifi cation cast serious doubts on the contractor’s 
reliability? The language of the recitals can well be interpreted to support that conclusion and to allow 
exclusion of any tenderer for having participated in a prior unlawful contract modifi cation.
The above examples seem to indicate that, as a result of unlawful contract modifi cation, the remedy of 
ineff ectiveness can de facto seriously penalise the concerned contractors (suppliers and service providers).*61 
In this regard, the infl uence of the contract-modifi cation rules and the remedy of ineff ectiveness can be said 
to be fundamentally distinct from the rationale of the rest of the EU public procurement law. While, gen-
erally, following EU public procurement rules is understood to be mandatory for the contracting authori-
ties as addressees of the legislation, here, the suppliers (contractors) can be subjected to signifi cant costs, 
deprived of the expected profi t, and perhaps excluded from future procurements as a result of breach of EU 
public procurement rules. Notably, such consequences depend largely on the choices of national legislators, 
possibly reducing the uniformity of EU public procurement law. 
A question may be asked as to whether the result of de facto penalising suppliers for a breach of public 
contract modifi cation rules is in harmony with the purpose and the general principles of the public pro-
curement law. On one hand, the birth of the concept of ineff ectiveness itself seems to lead to the conclu-
sion that, next to contracting authorities, suppliers bear part of the responsibility for following EU pub-
lic procurement law. For instance, in the case Commission v. Germany (C-503/04), the Court refused to 
uphold the arguments of the participating Member States in protection of the continued eff ect of the wrong-
fully awarded contract with reference to, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty and the protection 
of legitimate expectations.*62 Disregarding possible legitimate expectations of the other contracting party 
or any ‘provisions, practices or situations prevailing’ in Member States’ domestic legal order, the Court 
asserted that no private-law interest could ‘justify the failure to observe obligations arising under Commu-
nity law’.*63 Therefore, contracting parties cannot be exempted from suff ering the consequences of being a 
party to an illegal award, even if the party subject to the regulation and therefore technically the only one in 
breach is actually the contracting authority. 
A similar example of rationale submitting otherwise ‘innocent’ parties to regulation not directly 
addressed to them can be found in the CJEU case law with regard to the state-aid law. Here, an undertaking 
is presumed to have a duty of diligence to determine whether the required procedure for granting aid has 
been followed. By analogy, suppliers (contractors) under public contracts can be subjected to a certain duty 
of diligence to know and to follow the main rules of EU public procurement law, incl. the fundamental rules 
on contract modifi cation.*64
On the other hand, the Court in Pressetext acknowledged the possibility of the contractor having a right-
ful claim of damages against the contracting authority under the domestic law (para. 36). Such acknowl-
edgement indicates the opposite – any negative consequences can be compensated for and made good later, 
confi rming the status of suppliers as innocent bystanders. 
ɷɲ See, on this subject, J. Arnould. Damages for performing an illegal contract: The other side of the mirror – comments on the 
three recent judgments of the French Council of State. – Public Procurement Law Review ɷ, ɳɱɱɹ, p. NAɳɸɶ: ‘the nullity of 
the contract […] makes another “victim” of the infringement of the public procurement rules: the supplier, service provider 
or contractor with which the contract was concluded.’ 
ɷɳ Case C-ɶɱɴ/ɱɵ, Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECLI:EU:C:ɳɱɱɸ:ɵɴɳ, para. ɴɲ.
ɷɴ Paras ɴɳ, ɴɴ, ɴɹ.
ɷɵ M.A. Simovart. Limits to freedom of contract… ɳɱɲɱ, pp. ɳɱɲ–ɳɱɳ. On the matter of contractors’ diligence in public con-
tracting situation, see also K.-M. Halonen. Hankintasopimuksen tehottomuus: hankinta- ja velvoiteoikeudekkinen tutkimus 
hankintasopimuksen tehottomuudesta ja hankintayksikön vahingonkorvausvastuusta sen entiselle sopimuskumppanille. 
Turku: Turun yliopisto ɳɱɲɶ, pp. ɲɺɲ–ɳɱɱ; K.-M. Halonen. Shielding against damages for ineff ectiveness: The limitations of 
liability available for contracting authorities – a Finnish approach. – Public Procurement Law Review ɵ, ɳɱɲɶ, pp. ɲɲɶ–ɲɲɸ.
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2.3. Damage claims of contractors (suppliers) 
based on contract ineffectiveness
Following the declaration of ineff ectiveness of a partially performed modifi ed contract and having suff ered 
fi nancial harm as a result, the former contracting partner may resort to claiming damages or restitution 
from the contracting authority as the party generally regarded as liable for following the EU procurement 
rules.*65 
Such claims are subject to unharmonised private-law rules of the Member States and can lead to con-
troversial results and signifi cant legal uncertainty.*66 Under some legal regimes, ex-contractors may be 
awarded generous compensation as a result of contract ineff ectiveness, while the situation may be the oppo-
site and successful claims of damages very problematic in other jurisdictions – often because of hardship 
related to the required burden of proof.*67 When the contract has been declared ineff ective ex tunc, or 
void, the contract’s clauses cease to carry any legal force. In such a situation, most civil-law jurisdictions 
prescribe restitution and return of receivables under unjustifi ed enrichment law.*68 These rules prescribe 
the return of, or compensation for, everything received under the void contract and may even oblige the 
contractor to pay interest on the sums received for performance in advance (if any). 
With a view to possible diff erences in national approaches, J. Arnould has referred to the need for the 
EU law to fi nd solutions to confl icting rules on compensating for damages.*69 National rules on unjustifi ed 
enrichment and/or damage claims that are overly restrictive towards ex-contractors’ claims against con-
tracting authorities, and demand too high a level of diligence from contractors, may inhibit fair competition 
in public procurement. Accordingly, the law would not be in harmony with the rationale of the EU public 
procurement law. On the contrary, regulations unreasonably generous to ex-contractors under ineff ective 
public contracts tend to eliminate the economic operators’ incentive to ensure a modifi cation’s lawfulness, 
and can undermine the remedy’s effi  cacy.*70 
At present, acknowledgement of such considerations and the drawing of a reasonable balance are left 
solely to the national legislators. However, application of EU public procurement law would benefi t from a 
levelled approach to the rights ex-contractors have in cases of ineff ectiveness following unlawful contract 
modifi cations. When the extent of reimbursement allowed for contractors in such cases diff ers signifi cantly 
from Member State to Member State, the enforcement of the new public contract modifi cation rules leads 
to signifi cant divergence in the EU-wide legal situation and might work against the actual purpose of estab-
lishing the common rules on contract modifi cation. 
3. Access to information as a prerequisite to review*71
Under the peer-review (supplier-initiated) remedies system, any genuine opportunity for timely challenge 
of a contracting authority’s failure to follow the rules on public contract modifi cation presumes the com-
petitors’ knowledge of the making of a modifi cation. The lack of publicly available or disclosed information 
about amendments creates an obstacle to submitting claims of unlawful contract modifi cations.*72
At present, the (mostly) private-law contracts awarded in public procurement can be subject to 
unfounded confi dentiality agreements. Typically, competitors do not have any information about a 
ɷɶ Struckmann, Hodal ɳɱɲɴ, p. ɴɵ; Halonen. Shielding against damages… ɳɱɲɶ, p. ɲɲɳ.
ɷɷ On the subject of damages as a remedy in diff erent Member States generally, see, e.g., D. Fairgrieve, F. Lichere, editors. 
Public Procurement Law: Damages as an Eff ective Remedy. Oxford and Portland, Oregon, ɳɱɲɲ.
ɷɸ E. Fels. Euroopa Liidu riigihankeõiguse normide rikkumise mõju hankelepingu kehtivusele. Magistritöö. Juhendaja: M.A. 
Simovart [‘Contract validity in the case of infringement of European Union public procurement rules’, a master’s thesis; 
supervisor: M.A. Simovart]. Tallinn, ɳɱɲɶ, p. ɶɷ; Halonen. Shielding against damages… ɳɱɲɶ, pp. ɲɲɳ–ɲɲɴ.
ɷɹ Struckmann, Hodal ɳɱɲɵ, p. ɴɶ.
ɷɺ Arnould, p. NAɳɸɶ.
ɸɱ Arnould, p. NAɳɸɹ.
ɸɲ See, on this subject, Ginter, Parrest, Simovart. Access to the content of public procurement contracts: The case for a general 
EU-law duty of disclosure. – Public Procurement Law Review ɵ, ɳɱɲɴ, pp. ɲɶɵ–ɲɷɵ; Ginter, Parrest, Simovart. Ärisaladuse 
kaitse ja hankelepingute avalikustamise nõue riigihankeõiguses. Juridica ɳɱɲɴ, No. ɺ, pp. ɷɶɹ–ɷɷɶ.
ɸɳ M.A. Simovart. Old remedies for new violations? UrT ɳɱɲɶ/ɲ, p. ɵɶ. The diffi  culty of bringing a timely action of ineff ective-
ness when there has been no prior publication of contract notice has been recognised in Case C-ɲɷɷ/ɲɵ, MedEval, para. ɵɳ.
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modifi cation being made, or about its content, and are thus not aware of any possibly occurring breach.*73 
In eff ect, substantial modifi cations may easily go unchallenged and remain in force for the mere reason of 
lack of information about them.
Even though a default requirement of disclosure about public contracts and their modifi cations can 
be argued to follow from the EU procurement law’s general principle of transparency, a duty to provide 
access to public contracts is not yet a clearly established or universally followed rule in all Member States. 
An explicit default right of access to information about the performance stage of public contracts would 
facilitate actual information about contract modifi cations. Under the new directives, some contract modifi -
cations are subject to reporting by contracting authorities and entities,*74 but these obligations do not apply 
to all cases of modifi cations. 
The default disclosure rule has, inter alia, been recommended with the purpose of improving anti-
corruption policies in public procurement*75 as implementing high transparency standards and strengthen-
ing control mechanisms during the contract performance period. Establishing reasonable restrictions on 
drafting and enforcing confi dentiality clauses in public procurement contracts under the national laws is 
therefore advisable. 
In addition to the lack of information, procedural issues and lack of motivation may lessen third-party 
initiative to review contract modifi cations. Breaches of contract modifi cation rules have been described as 
falling into the category of cases that do not benefi t from the advantages normally applicable to the sup-
plier review system: the competitors are not able to monitor the making of the modifi cations and to detect 
breaches in a timely manner, the process of contract performance is not closely related to the competitors’ 
direct interests, and the suppliers do not have the strongest incentive to monitor and claim review of pos-
sible breaches.*76 In addition, the burden of proof may be unreasonably heavy for competitors.*77 There-
fore, instead of subjecting the cases of unlawful contract modifi cation to supplier review, an additional or 
alternative system of outside review in the way of disciplinary, administrative, or criminal sanctions could 
be considered by national legislators. That may appear to be a more eff ective way of enforcing the rules on 
public contract modifi cation.*78 
Such alternative or additional outside review options could have the specifi c benefi t of discovering and 
imposing sanctions for breaches of public contract modifi cation rules that could go undetected or unchal-
lenged under the peer-review system. Detection and enforcement through an external national system of 
sanctions could be worth considering especially if the external review body will be able to practise a proactive 
approach to detecting and expeditiously sanctioning breaches.*79 While the reactive review procedures cur-
rently practised in accordance with the remedies directives remain available to persons with a direct interest 
and incentive to initiate review proceedings, persons with no standing for the purpose of review proceedings 
could be able to refer breaches to such competent authority. The alternative means of involvement would 
guarantee ‘sound procurement procedures’ as indicated in the recitals to the new directives.*80 Accordingly, 
the outside review can better serve the need of eff ective enforcement of the new rules on contract modifi cation. 
4. Conclusions
Enforcement of the rules on public contract modifi cation can lead to ineff ectiveness of the unlawfully modi-
fi ed contract or a part of it. In public procurement cases, parties must be given standing before the court 
or the review body at least if they can show suffi  cient interest in the concerned contract and the presence 
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of prejudice caused by the breach. In matters of contract modifi cation, any potential bidder should satisfy 
these requirements. Only when it is ‘plainly obvious’ that they have no potential for competing for the 
contract should the person be found to have no standing. As a rule, parties protecting general or indirect 
interests should not have standing for the purpose of using public procurement remedies.
Wider legal implications of contract ineff ectiveness under national jurisdictions can be controversial, 
particularly with regard to fi nancial rights of contractors (suppliers) in relation to contracting authorities, 
following ineff ectiveness. Moreover, the new directives can be interpreted to allow exclusion from future 
procurements of contractors (suppliers) who have been parties to agreements providing unlawful modifi ca-
tion. Thereby, in some jurisdictions, contractors become de facto duty-holders bearing actual liability for 
upholding the public contract modifi cation rules, while in others they would suff er a much lesser burden. 
A genuine opportunity to eff ectively challenge unlawful contract modifi cations by means of peer review 
requires third-party access to information about the contract performance, incl. modifi cations. The lack of 
clear rules on access to information on public contracts can discourage eff ective review practices. Either 
as alternatives to contract ineff ectiveness or as additional review options, sanctions enforceable through 
external (administrative) review could benefi t the purpose of upholding the rules on contract modifi cation. 
In order to provide a uniform system of remedies for interested third parties, to level the regime of 
enforcing public contract modifi cation rules, and to allow for effi  cient enforcement of EU public procure-
ment law, the current system of remedies in public procurement might benefi t from review. 
